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Two weeks ago was the 40th anniversary of President Nixon’s 
dramatic resignation. He did so against his own will, in order to 
avoid the certainty of impeachment as a result of the Watergate 
case. This event, together with the traumatic defeat and 
withdrawal from Vietnam that preceded it, resulted in a dramatic 
loss of trust in the Executive, followed by strong legislative action 
to limit its powers. It also revealed the growing partisan 
polarization that has characterized the politics of the following 
four decades. 
Today we may be living the climax of this polarization, as 
Congress is unable to pass badly-needed legislation on 
immigration, energy and infrastructure funding, to name a few. 
Indeed, not even the presence of 40,000 unaccompanied Central 
American children at the border is sufficiently dramatic to bring 
about some kind of consensual action. At the same time, 
President Obama is being sued by the House leadership for abuse 
of power, and the media are irresponsibly talking about possible 
impeachment, the ultimate use of legislative power against a 
democratically elected President. 
The transformative President has fulfilled or at the very least 
addressed most of the platform under which he was elected in 
2008 and re-elected in 2012. Obstruction in Congress, his own 
bad foreign policy decisions and constant complaints from the 
left wing of his own party have resulted in low approval ratings 
(around 40%) by a frustrated public that has, for the most part, 
tuned out of politics. This will no doubt have consequences for 
the coming mid-term elections, when the majority of voters will 
stay home, giving an advantage to the militant extremes on both 
sides of the ideological spectrum. 
Gridlock in government is nothing new. In fact, the fathers of the 
Constitution preferred Congress to “muddle through” rather than 
being too pro-active. Incremental, slow change was preferable to 
sweeping reforms. Yet this 113th Congress, now in its long August 
recess before its return to a full-fledged electoral campaign in 
September, is probably unique in its paralysis. There are not only 
deep divisions between the two Houses, each dominated by one 
party, but also within the House of Representatives itself, where 
the GOP has a majority of seats but is so internally divided that it 
has had to withdraw many of its own leadership-introduced bills 
for lack of votes from its own party. 
This Do-Nothing-Congress that left town on August 1st for a five-
week recess is the least productive in History: Congressional 
productivity is down from 151 in the previous 112th Congress to 
142; the originally “Do-Nothing Congress” of 1947-48 passed 906 
laws. 
Nothing seems to be sufficiently urgent or dramatic enough to 
bring the GOP legislators to a consensus, not even the 
unprecedented border crisis, where 40,000 unaccompanied 
migrant children from Central America are amassed in military 
bases and other government agencies at the southern border, 
awaiting due process. The House leadership was ready to pass a 
bill to provide a small part of the funding the President had 
requested to help him address the surge of newly arrived 
immigrants, but it did not have the votes. The Tea Party, on the 
other hand, opposed the funding and wanted to introduce its own 
bill to speedily deport the children and to rescind the President’s 
authority to decide whether to deport or not certain 
undocumented immigrants from earlier waves of immigration. 
Late in the afternoon of their last day in the Capitol when all bags 
were packed and representatives were ready to leave, Speaker 
John Boehner announced he was ready to withdraw his bill since 
he didn’t have the votes, and let the recess begin. But Tea Party 
favorites Steven King and Michele Bachman demanded a vote on 
both measures. Finally, at the eleventh hour, Boehner 
compromised: both bills were introduced and passed by a narrow 
vote. They are at this point insignificant, and very unlikely to 
become laws since the Senate will not consider them. But the 
point was made: the Tea Party’s main goals is not solving any 
problems, but instead keepconstraining presidential powers to 
the point of total ineffective government. They are succeeding to 
a large extent, even if Obama has been quite deft at using his 
executive authority of implementation to break free from the 
imposed legislative shackles. 
Dysfunction in government is the new normalcy in the nation’s 
capital. These bills were only a modest attempt to deal with the 
crisis of the day, but the acrimonious debate brought into relief a 
bigger systemic failure: the inability of Congress, since 2007, to 
pass a comprehensive overhaul of Immigration law. Once the 
Senate passed it last summer, it was expected that the House may 
come up with its own proposal, which would have been a series of 
smaller bills to solve the problem piecemeal, thereby satisfying 
different constituencies with a mixture of more border security, 
more workers’ permits and other special visas, and the granting 
of legal status to the 11 million undocumented. 
Unlike the year 2007, when G.W. Bush had expressed support for 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform legislation but could not 
muster enough consensus, this time around (2013-2014) it was 
supposed to be different. For the first time the concept had 
widespread support from all the very powerful interest groups 
concerned: corporations, labor unions, the Christian Evangelical 
right and immigration advocates. But it was halted by the Tea 
Party in the House and no legislation was passed. 
It is this vacuum, among others, that the Executive has been 
trying to fill through administrative measures and executive 
decrees. The President used his prosecutorial discretion to solve 
some aspects of the enormously complex issue of dealing with 11 
million undocumented immigrants, most of whom have lived and 
worked in the US for ten, twenty, or even thirty years. One 
example is the President’s policy directive that provided 
temporary relief from deportation and study/work authorization 
to young people brought here illegally by their parents between 
certain dates, and under certain conditions (DACA). Lately, 
Obama has expressed some interest in extending DACA to the 
children’s families, causing more Tea party outrage and 
increasing their attempts to stop him. 
To strike a balance and to give more legitimacy to his unilateral 
decision to solve that part of the problem, the President has 
applied to the letter the pre-existing immigration law to deport 
(other) immigrants through the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement Agency. He has deported more immigrants than 
any other president before him (360,000 in 2013 alone), earning 
him the sobriquet of “Deporter-in-chief” and the antipathy of 
immigrant advocate groups. 
During the latest crisis of children at the border, Speaker 
Boehner expressed his “frustration and his concern” with the 
situation, and quite cynically called on Obama to “take steps to 
secure the border and return the children to their home 
countries”, adding that the President “didn’t need Congressional 
action to do that”. Given that the Speaker is suing the President 
(just a political gesture, since he has no legal standing to do so) 
for over-stepping his Constitutional powers, his hectoring makes 
even less sense. In any case, his frustration was misdirected: 
Obama had asked Congress to approve funding for this operation 
and a Republican bill was ready to be introduced, but the Speaker 
himself was struggling to get the Tea Party votes he needed to 
pass it. This sort of dysfunction is a weakness the Republican 
Party will need to address in order to succeed in future elections. 
The November mid-term election will be critical: according to the 
latest polls, Republicans have around an eighty per cent chance 
to win the six seats they would need for a majority in the Senate. 
With both Houses in Republican hands, the President will not 
only lose the minimum control he now has to shape the agenda 
but he will also find it very hard to keep in place the policies that 
he is already implementing. 
If we add to that the problematic challenges he is now faced with 
on several foreign policy fronts, none of which can be solved in 
the short term, a Republican win becomes almost certain, not 
only in 2014 but also perhaps in the 2016 presidential election. 
But in order to seal those wins, Republicans will need two 
fundamental elements they lack now: party unity and a positive 
agenda. 
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